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Taking everybody on board: multiparty politics as an instrument for peace 
The 1992 General Peace Agreement, signed in Rome by president Joaquim Chissano and 
guerrilla leader Afonso Dhlakama, marked the beginning of a ‘pacted’ and fundamentally 
successful process of democratic change in Mozambique.1 The country’s first pluralist 
elections, held in 1994, established a formally competitive system, which opened the political 
arena to the guerrillas of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo). Democratic 
reform was instrumental to the pacification of the country and, with peace and stability 
restored all over the territory, came dividends in the form of resumed economic activities and 
impressive rates of growth. Nevertheless, Mozambique remains among the poorest countries 
in the world. Its achievements over the last decade are emphasised by the striking contrast 
with the failed political transition of its twin country, Angola. The political trajectories of 
these former Portuguese colonies – where Marx-Leninist regimes were introduced at 
independence in 1975, prompting former Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to 
sponsor civil conflicts – began to diverge in the early 1990s. While Mozambicans swiftly 
moved towards peace and pluralist politics, Angola’s negotiated settlement failed when 
guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi withdrew from the electoral process in 1992. As his Unión 
Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) rebels resumed fighting, the 
country was plunged into ten years of renewed devastation before a second opportunity for 
peace emerged in early 2002, following Savimbi’s death in combat. The failure of political 
reforms prevented pacification in Angola and, alongside thousands of lives, another decade 
was lost with no signs of development. 
 
The 1994 and 1999 elections in Mozambique confirmed Frelimo as the country’s ruling 
party. Joaquim Chissano, the un-elected president since 1986, was twice endorsed by the 
electorate with an absolute majority. In each of the two parliamentary elections, Frelimo 
obtained a plurality of the vote, which was turned into a majority in the House. But a key 
outcome of the first election, later born out by the 1999 results, was Renamo’s impressive 
performance. In spite of an appalling record of violence inflicted upon Mozambicans, the 
guerrillas-turned-into-party immediately positioned themselves as an unchallenged and 
challenging second force under the new constitutional framework. 
 
The adoption of supposedly democratic politics in several African countries, since the first 
half of the 1990s, raises the need to distinguish between those few countries that are 
progressively developing liberal democratic practices and many others that are failing to do 
so. Furthermore, it is also fair and convenient to discriminate between countries where 
democratic forms are merely meant to cover unmodified authoritarian habits – that is, 
pseudo-democracies – from electoral democracies that, despite their fundamentally 
                                                 
1 ‘Pacted’ transitions, in which state or social agents negotiate the modes of transition and the main rules of the 
emerging democratic game, have been relatively uncommon in Africa.  See Michael Bratton & Nicholas Van de 
Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.117. 
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competitive elections and the partial constitutionalisation of politics, fall short of fully 
democratic and liberal practices.2 Mozambique, whose political system is still characterized 
by an ambiguous relationship between ruling party and state apparatus, a heavy centralisation 
of power, increasingly rampant corruption, and the feeble independence of the legislative, 
media and judicial systems, belongs to the latter group of states – i.e., states that made 
significant changes by adopting and partly implementing democratic reforms, but still have a 
long way to go before they might be labelled liberal democracies. 
 
In a transition from civil war to peaceful politics, the party system can be the channel through 
which formerly violent contestants for power are allowed a role in a new, non-violent 
political game. The present paper focuses on Mozambique’s emerging two-party system as an 
essential feature affecting the country’s prospects for democratic deepening and 
consolidation. Political parties are unique instruments for the peaceful transfer of democratic 
political power. The regularisation, stabilisation and legitimation of democratic politics 
hinge, to a significant extent, upon the presence of a stable and well- functioning party 
system. Political parties articulate government programmes, promote political stances, keep 
the executive under check. They help define the meaning of political competition by 
providing political identities that are recognizable over subsequent electoral periods. They 
contribute to linking a country’s territory with its capital city by communicating upwards 
demands and needs, as well as by legitimising downwards central decisions and policy 
directives. 
 
But the condition for political parties to actually help the establishment of democratic politics 
is their development as durable, socially-rooted, country-wide effective and legitimate 
organisations. Thus, a well- functioning democratic polity requires the institutionalisation of 
the party system. In his studies of Latin American democratisation processes, Mainwaring 
proposes to move beyond the two classic criteria for party system analysis (i.e. number of 
parties and ideological polarisation3) and to adopt ‘institutionalisation’ as a property (and a 
process) crucially differentiating party systems. He defines an institutionalised party system 
as one where “there is stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave. Change, 
while not completely precluded, is limited”. 4 Therefore, party system institutionalisation 
depends on four elements, namely: “stability in interparty competition, the existence of 
parties that have somewhat stable roots in society, acceptance of parties and elections as the 
legitimate institutions that determine who governs, and party organisations with reasonably 
stable rules and structures”. 5 Of course, extreme levels of institutionalisation may produce 
negative effects, notably a paralysis of political competition and a lack of accountability or 
political change. Yet comparative evidence supports the idea that an institutionalised party 
system is an important factor for democratic consolidation, as it tends to promote political 
                                                 
2 Larry Diamond, Developing democracy: toward consolidation , Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999, pp.7ff. 
3 See, for example, Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party systems. A Framework for analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.288. 
4 Scott Mainwaring, ‘Party systems in the third wave’, Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 1998, p.68. 
5 Scott Mainwaring & Timothy Scully, ‘Introduction. Party systems in Latin America” and “Conclusion. Party 
and democracy in Latin America - Different patterns, common challenges’, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy 
Scully (eds.), Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995, p.1, emphasis added. For a reflection on the notions of party and party system institutionalisation, 
including the possible tensions between the two, see Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand , ‘Party institutionalization 
in new democracies’, Party Politics, 8:1 (2001), pp.5-29. 
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legitimacy, electoral and horizontal accountability, and effective governance.6 An 
institutionalised party system reduces the space for populist appeals and candidates, keeps the 
personalisation of political power under check, helps restrain neo-patrimonial practices and 
potentially limits the marginalisation of parliament. The latter phenomena, by contrast, 
normally thrive in inchoate party systems, the empirical opposite of institutionalised party 
systems. Here, electoral volatility and uncertainty, in conjunction with the weak social 
linkages and the poor authority and organisation of political parties, are often the terrain for 
the persistence of low-quality and non-consolidating democracies and for the development or 
retention of semi-authoritarian delegative practices. Thus, “the institutionalisation of a party 
system is important if for no other reason than what its opposite – an inchoate party system – 
implies for how democracies function”. 7 
 
In what follows, the Mozambican party system is analysed in terms of its social and historical 
rootedness, its electoral stability, the organisation of its component parts, and its overall 
legitimacy. An additional section further elaborates on the dynamics of inter-party relations. 
Finally, some tentative conclusions are drawn with regard to the effects of the current party 
system on the broader democratisation process. 
 
The historical origins and socio-political bases of Frelimo and Renamo 
Democratic political competition in Mozambique is heavily shaped by past patterns of 
conflict. Both main political parties emerged out of armed experiences. Established in Dar-es-
Salaam in 1962, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) was forged by the anti-
colonial war fought against the Portuguese between 1964 and 1974. Backed by Zambia and 
Algeria, the liberation front mostly operated in the north of the country, launching its 
operations from rear bases in the Tanzanian territory. The northernmost province of Cabo 
Delgado naturally became the main area for the recruitment of anti-colonial fighters (notably 
among the Makonde people) and remains a stronghold of the party. Yet, because Frelimo’s 
top leadership has invariably come from the south – the movement was “essentially a 
coalition of cadres from the extreme south and a guerrilla mass in the extreme north”8 – 
southern dominance inevitably came to be resented, even before the new regime was 
established.9 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Leonardo Morlino, ‘Consolidation and party government in Southern Europe’, International 
Political Science Review, 16:2 (1995), pp.145-168 on Southern European democracies (Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece);  Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Ungovernability, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, and ‘Centralisation and Powerlessness: India’s Democracy in Comparative 
Perspective’, in Joel Migdal & Atul Kohli, et al. (eds.), State Power and Social Forces, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, pp.89-107 on the Indian experience; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber & John 
Stephens, Capitalist development and democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, p.168, and Mainwaring & 
Scully (1995) on Latin American cases. For a differing view, based on study of Eastern European post-
communist states, see Gábor Tóka, ‘Poltical parties in East Central Europe’, in Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, 
Chu Yun-han and Tien Hung-Mao (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave democracies. Themes and perspectives, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1997, pp.93-134. 
7 Mainwaring & Scully (1995), p.21. Cf. Mainwaring (1998), p.79. For the notion of ‘delegative democracy’, 
see Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative democracy’, Journal of democracy, 5:1 (1994), pp.55-69. 
8 Michel Cahen, ‘“Dhlakama é maningue nice!” An atypical former guerrilla in the Mozambican electoral 
campaign’, Transformation, 35 (1998), p.10. 
9 Eduardo Mondlane (the first leader of Frelimo, killed by parcel bomb in 1969), Samora Machel (successor to 
Mondlane and first Mozambican president) and Joaquim Chissano were all born in Gaza province. Frelimo’s 
new secretary general and 2004 presidential candidate – Armando Guebuza, a Maronga from Maputo – is also a 
southerner. 
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Three years after taking power, at its 3rd Congress in 1977, Frelimo adopted important 
structural and ideological measures by transforming the liberation movement into a Marxist-
Leninist party. Long lasting implications derived from this move. The Leninist notion of a 
vanguard single party, with restricted membership and party primacy over the state, implied a 
decision to do away with opposition political organisations and thus the latter’s repression. 
Centrally-planned and collectivist socio-economic and agricultural policies also had key 
political consequences. The systematic privilege accorded to the urban and industrial sectors 
– directly or indirectly subsidized by the state – and the combination of neglect and forced 
‘modernisation’ for rural communities heavily contributed to widespread social 
disillusionment and bitterness. Many of the measures undertaken to achieve a revolutionary 
transformation of the Mozambican society – such as the forced resettlements envisaged by 
collective villagisation programmes or the ideological attacks on traditional institutions – 
deepened a sense of distance and antagonism between Frelimo and those broad sections of 
the population that were officially or practically identified as obstacles to development. 
Geographically, this antagonism became most evident in the provinces of the central and 
centre-north regions – Sofala, Manica, Zambezia, Tete and Nampula – which progressively 
turned into a fertile ground for anti-Frelimo sentiments. In a similar environment, a conflict 
sparked by foreign powers met less than fierce resistance among local populations and 
gradually acquired some domestic support. In the large areas of central Mozambique, 
Renamo’s guerrillas were able to operate most successfully and to establish links with local 
communities. They alternated raids and devastation on some parts of the country with 
relatively stable control over other areas, and progressively built upon existing opposition to 
the dominant political economy. The brutalities and the atrocities suffered by many during 
the civil conflict – largely, if not exclusively, committed at the hands of the rebels – have for 
some time drawn attention away from the underlying and growing resentment of parts of 
Mozambican society towards the Frelimo regime. The largely coercive recruitment of 
Renamo members has tended to hide a degree of tacit support that the movement enjoyed, if 
not for its vicious actions, at least for its effective opposition to the ruling group in Maputo. 
As a result of Frelimo’s rural policies, by the early-1980s: 
 
…the people became divided in search of an identity on which to build their own 
survival. Traditionalism, a strong reference in the recent memory of the 
community, flourished anew as the natural refuge... In this vacuum Renamo 
appeared as an armed opposition ... to some extent interpreting this movement of 
a popular psychological and cultural retreat to values and models of the past.10 
 
Dhlakama’s movement became an outspoken defender of traditional rules and leadership, of 
religious beliefs and of (especially non-southern) rural communities – in other words, a 
protector of all those who had been penalised or marginalized under Frelimo’s rule: “the 
creation of a state hostile to African society … gave rise to the hope and in some cases to the 
reality of withdrawing from the modern state thanks to the protection of the guerrillas”.11 
Thus, while it has long been acknowledged that the insurgency was initiated by Southern 
Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Renamo rapidly turned into a 
‘Mozambican phenomenon’.12 
                                                 
10 José Luis Cabaço, ‘The long march of Mozambican democracy’, in Brazão Mazula (ed.), Mozambique: 
elections, democracy and development, Maputo, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p.89. 
11 Cahen (1998), pp.10-11. 
12 Alex Vines, Renamo: from terrorism to democracy in Mozambique?, Center for Southern Africa studies,  
London & Bloomington: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1996, p.1. The works of Vines (1996) and 
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After the 1980 Lancaster House agreement ended white rule in Southern Rhodesia, favouring 
a robust domestic offensive by the Mozambican army, Renamo came back stronger than 
before when South Africa decided that it would not let the destabilising insurgency fade. 
With the Nkomati pact, according to which Mozambique and South Africa would stop 
supporting rebels operating beyond borders, the guerrillas became determined to put down 
roots inside Mozambique and achieve self-sufficiency. Between 1984-1986, at the peak of the 
civil war, Renamo extended its activities to regions other than its core areas of Manica and 
Sofala provinces, and was soon operating in the whole country with an estimated 20,000 
soldiers13. In 1992, however, the rebels’ dependence on local populations added to the impact 
of the severe drought that hit the country, as the latter forced thousands of peasants to leave 
rural areas and left the insurgents without their main source of food and labour.14 
 
The dynamics of the civil war combined with the regime’s attempts at transforming society 
and promoted the formation of two rival socio-political coalitions that were ripe for 
expression when a pluralist election was called. Contrary to what happened in other African 
political transitions – such as those of Ghana, Zambia and Mali, for example, where 
prominent parties emerged during the reform process15 – Mozambique’s major political 
parties were formed prior to the country’s political opening. As a matter of fact, while 
Frelimo and Renamo only recently began to compete as parties in a pluralist milieu, their 
organisations have both been in existence for 25 years or more.16 
 
By 1992-94, however, when Frelimo and Renamo decided to abandon their weapons and to 
embark on a new game based on electoral competition, their starting conditions were 
immensely different. Frelimo was still profoundly influenced by the experience of the 
independence struggle, both in its ideology and rhetoric as in its inner life (party members 
who fought the Portuguese, for example, are still accorded unquestioned leadership and 
privileges). As a single party, the Frente was meant to closely direct state activities and drive 
the country’s development effort – indeed, its structures were to function as ‘scaffolds’ for 
the legitimisation of ‘an external, alien state’.17 By fully surviving the transition to multiparty 
politics, the party confirmed its capacity for adaptation. Having governed for twenty years, its 
leadership and cadres were tested and experienced in national government, policy- and law-
making, administration of state structures, political organisation and mobilisation, and 
diplomatic relations. This well-oiled former single party organisation faced the competition 
                                                                                                                                                        
Christian Geffray, La cause des armes au Mozambique: anthropologie d'une guerre civile, Paris: Karthala, 1990 
are a key part of a ‘revisionist’ school that has re-focused the analysis of the civil war by emphasising the 
latter’s domestic roots. See Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: who calls the shots? , London: James Currey, 1991, 
p.5 for a substantial rejection of such views. 
13 Vines (1996), p.17; and Jeremy Weinstein, ‘Mozambique: a fading UN success story’, Journal of Democracy, 
13:1 (2002), p.148. 
14 Vines (1996), p.1. 
15 Cf. Richard Sandbrook, ‘Transitions without consolidation: democratisation in six African cases’, Third 
World Quarterly, 17:1 (1996), p.75. 
16 Even when subtracting the 18 seats of the União Eleitoral coalition parties (which formed commo n lists with 
Renamo and belong to the same Renamo -Ue parliamentary group), Frelimo and Renamo still control 92.8% of 
the seats in the 1999-2004 Assembleia. Only in four out of thirty African multiparty polities examined did 
parties founded by 1970 – the cut-off date chosen by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001:454) as an indicator of 
parties’ time-tested social roots – hold more than 90% of lower-chamber seats (Botswana, Zimbabwe, Togo and 
Mauritius) and only one additional country (Côte d’Ivoire) held more than 75%. 
17 Oscar Monteiro, interview (Maputo, 21 June 2002). “The People’s Republic of Mozambique is oriented by 
the political line defined by Frelimo, which is the driving force of both the state and society” (art. 3, 
Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1975, quoted in Cahen, 1985, p.38). 
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of newly-created opposition parties, as occurred in several of the multiparty regimes that 
emerged in Africa during the 1990s. Renamo’s guerrillas, in particular, were only hurriedly 
re-organised from a clandestine military movement into a national political party in the run 
up to the election. Historically, the ranks of the rebels had mostly expanded through the 
coercive recruitment of young guerrillas. The new party now faced a very peculiar challenge: 
 
In other [African] countries ... the holding of elections forced parties which were 
mostly urban, elite-based and without much of a grassroots presence or 
constituency to go out and mobilize ‘the rural masses’ ... For Renamo, the 
problem is a different one ... Because of its character as a guerrilla army, Renamo 
has roots in large portions of the national territory. It has representatives at local 
levels  in much of the country... Thus, it is not an intellectual, urban-based party 
trying to put down roots in the countryside, but a military organisation with 
weakly developed administrative and political wings having to downplay its 
military character and strengthen its political and administrative side, largely by 
recruiting in the cities.18 
 
When multiparty politics were introduced in Mozambique, the political structures of the 
former rebels were still fragile, the internal procedures of the new party hardly effective, its 
presence on the ground was rather unorganised, its policies were in all evidence poorly 
articulated, and its personnel was totally inexperienced in modern politics and administration. 
 
 
Two-party electoral competition 
The adoption of political reforms in Mozambique began when Frelimo’s Central Committee 
agreed on a new constitution in 1990. Two years later, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) 
provided the key step that made the introduction of multiparty politics an actual possibility. 
The GPA was an agreement between the top leaderships of the two sides – Frelimo and 
Renamo – which, from the start, marginalized every other voice, notably those of the 
unarmed political oppositions. Thus, the new political settlement was the result of an elitist 
deal, and, in fact, the country was moving towards its first multiparty election despite the fact 
that a majority of Mozambicans, when consulted by the government, expressed themselves 
against the abandonment of the single party regime.19 The extent of actual popular support for 
the signatories of the accord was yet to be proven. This was notably the case for Dhlakama’s 
rebel movement: in spite of the considerable social discontent generated by many of 
Frelimo’s policies, prior to the election one could legitimately doubt Renamo’s capacity to 
gain support in a country where it waged a brutal civil war for 15 years.20 On the eve of the 
1994 election, it was not uncommon for analysts to point out that “Renamo’s prospects are … 
                                                 
18 Carrie Manning, ‘Constructing opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as a political party’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 24:1 (1998), p.188. 
19 Carrie Manning, Democratic transition in Mozambique, 1992-1995: beginning at the end? , PhD Thesis, 
University of California at Berkeley, 1997, p.91 and Margaret Hall & Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan. 
Mozambique since independence, London: Hurst and Co., 1997, p.210. Cf. Graham Harrison, ‘Democracy in 
Mozambique: the significance of multi-party elections’, Review of African Political Economy , 67 (1996), pp.19-
35 on the elitist character of the transition. 
20 An interesting recent case of failure of a powerful guerrilla movement to transform into a political party is that 
of Sierra Leone, where the former rebels of the Revolutionary United Front – orphans of their jailed leader 
Foday Sankoh – only received 1.7 % of the vote in the post-conflict legislative election and failed to win any 
seat (UN Integrated Regional Information Network , 20 May 2002). Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor, by 
contrast, won an overwhelming majority (75.3%) in a 1997 presidential election reportedly characterised by the 
voters’ fear that, if he were to lose the contest, he would resume the civil war. 
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bleak given its infamous reputation for brutality during the civil war”. 21 Yet, the former rebels 
surprised most observers by winning an average 36% of the vote in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections, and by further improving their showing five years later. 
 
Mozambique’s two elections, spanning a five-year period only, do not constitute a solid 
ground for more-than-tentative inferences regarding the future development of the country’s 
party system. The information available is undoubtedly limited. However, the relative 
stability displayed by party competition in the first two rounds of electoral contests is 
apparent: a clear, if only emerging, pattern of two-party competition that seems likely to be 
confirmed by further elections. In spite of a proportional system that is relatively favourable 
to the emergence of third parties – compared, for example, to a plurality system – hardly any 
political organisation other than the two main contenders gained representation in the 
Assembleia da República during the 1990s.22 
 
Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility is a tool that allows us to quantify the stability of 
inter-party competition in Mozambique and to compare it with other experiences.23 The index 
measures the net percentage of votes that, from one election to the next, shift from one party 
to another party. In other words, the lower the volatility, the more stable is the number of 
votes that parties receive over time and, as a consequence, the more stable the structure of the 
party system as a whole. Between 1994 and 1999, legislative volatility in Mozambique was a 
                                                 
21 Mark Simpson, ‘The foreign and domestic factors in the transformation of Frelimo’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 31:2 (1993), p.336. 
22 See below. The electoral threshold adopted in Mozambique, whereby only parties reaching 5% of the national 
vote take part in the distribution of parliamentary seats, is less of an obstacle to third parties than a plurality or a 
majority system would be. 
23 Pedersen’s measure of the electoral volatility between two legislative (or presidential) elections is calculated 
as: 
 
S  | (party X’s % at election I) – (party X’s % at election II) | 
________________________________________________ 
 
2 
 
Volatility between a legislative and a presidential election (‘legislative-presidential volatility’) is calculated as: 
 
S  | (party X’s % at presidential election) – (party X’s % at parliamentary election) | 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2 
 
Quite oddly, Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright measure legislative volatility as net changes in parties’ 
percentages of seats (‘Party system institutionalisation in 30 African countries’, Party Politics, 7:4 (2001), 
p.451), rather than votes. Such an index would not record any volatility between a hypothetical election 1 – won 
by party A with 55% of votes and seats, and lost by party B with 45% of votes and seats – and an election 2 in 
which party A wins again 55% of seats, but only gets 30% of votes, party B picks up 45% of seats with 25% of 
votes, and party C obtains a 20% vote share but no seat. Even more puzzling is Kuenzi and Lambright’s choice 
to mix pears and apples by defining presidential-parliamentary volatility as the difference “between votes 
captured by a party in a presidential election and … seats won by that same party in the corresponding 
legislative election” (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001, p.444). Although the authors find that district magnitude is 
not related to electoral volatility (p.451), their use of assembly seats, rather than votes, implies that a party 
which obtains exactly the same percentage of votes in a parliamentary and in a presidential election may still see 
its electoral support assessed as highly ‘volatile’ in those cases, for example, where a plurality system gives it a 
share of seats much larger than its share of the vote. Since my  calculations for electoral volatility (legislative, 
presidential and parliamentary-presidential) in Mozambique are all based on votes, the comparison with Kuenzi 
and Lambright’s data can only provide an impressionistic account. 
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relatively modest 8.9%, less than one third of an African average as high as 28.4% (Table 1). 
Over the same period, electoral volatility in the country’s presidential contests – at 14% – 
was higher than its legislative volatility, but it still measured less than half the African 
average (29.6%). The preponderance and the stability of Frelimo-Renamo competition in 
Mozambique is also evident across types of elections, i.e. when measuring the discrepancy 
between the votes obtained by a party in a given parliamentary election and those that the 
same party obtains in a corresponding presidential election. Parliamentary-presidential 
volatility in Mozambique measured 14.3% in 1994 and 12.7% in 1999, averaging 13.5% as 
against an African mean of 24.9%. These figures imply that turning an erratic game of bullets 
into a seemingly regularised count of ballots did not change who the main contestants for 
power were: at the beginning of the new century as in the late 1970s, political rule in 
Mozambique is still the result of a Frelimo-versus-Renamo confrontation. 
 
 
Table 1. Legislative, presidential and parliamentary-presidential electoral volatility for 
Mozambique (my own calculations) and for thirty African countries that do not include the 
latter  
(Source: Kuenzi & Lambright (2001), pp.449,452) 
 
 
 
Mozambique 
(%) 
African average 
(%) 
 
Parliamentary volatility 
 
8.9 
 
28.4 
 
Presidential volatility 
 
14 
 
29.6 
 
Parliamentary-presidential volatility (average) 
 
13.5 
 
24.9 
 
 
Electoral competition in Mozambique also reflects the conflictual legacy of the regional 
divides that the country developed during its anti-colonial struggle and the subsequent civil 
war. The regional polarisation of the Mozambican society is exposed by the results of the first 
two multiparty elections. Table 2 shows the number of seats obtained by the two main parties 
in each electoral constituency (i.e. the country’s ten provinces, plus Maputo city) for both the 
1994 and the 1999 election. 24. In these two successive electoral rounds, the geographical 
distribution of the seats won by the two major parties varied only marginally. With the 
exception of Niassa, the sole province where majority support shifted from one party to the 
other, election results confirmed the strong and stable regional roots of both Frelimo and 
Renamo. In most provinces, the dominance of one of the two main parties is so 
overwhelming that the environment is one of political homogeneity, with a huge majority of 
the people living in the same area (i.e. a province or, even more, a district) voting in the same 
way in favour of one party or the other, so that “the average Mozambican voter lives among 
                                                 
24 The proportional representation electoral system, with multi-member constituencies, means that the share of 
seats obtained in a given province by a given party is a proxy for the latter’s share of the provincial vote. In 
1994, a third party, União Democratica, obtained 9 seats evenly distributed between the north (3), the centre (3) 
and the south (3). In 1999, Renamo allied with the 10-party União Eleitoral coalition, which includes PUN 
(Party of National Unity), FAP (Popular Alliance Force), PPPM (Mozambique's Popular Party), ALIMO (Free 
Alliance of Mozambique), PUM (Mozambique's Unity Party) and PRD (Democratic Renewal Party), PVM 
(Mozambican Green Party), MONAMO (Mozambique's National Movement), PCN (Party of National 
Convention), and PALMO (Mozambique's Liberal Party). 
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and knows only people who support the same party and candidate”, a situation, as Weinstein 
points out, which is “hardly a recipe for a vibrant democratic civic culture”. 25 
 
Table 2. Number of parliamentary seats won by Frelimo, Renamo and União Democratica by 
electoral constituency, 1994 and 1999 elections. Figures in bold italic indicate which party won  
the majority of seats in a given constituency. 
 
 
Frelimo 
 
Renamo (-
UE) 
União Democratica 
 
Electoral constituencies 
1994 1999 1994 1999 (1994 only) 
       
Maputo City 17 14 1 2 - 
Maputo 
Province 
12 12 1 1 - 
Gaza 15 16 0 0 1 
South 
 
Inhambane 13 13 3 4 2 
       
Sofala 3 4 18 17 - 
Manica 4 5 9 10 - 
Tete 5 8 9 10 1 
Centre 
Zambezia 18 15 29 34 2 
       
Nampula 20 24 32 26 2 
Cabo Delgado 15 16 6 6 1 
North 
Niassa 7 6 4 7 - 
 
Total 
 
129 
 
133 
 
112 
 
117 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
Building sound party organisations? 
At the time Mozambique gained independence in 1974, Frelimo enjoyed broad and genuine 
legitimacy among wide sections of the population for its unchallenged role in leading the 
anti-colonial struggle. A substantial erosion of this initial support, as pointed out, 
progressively resulted from a combination of political and social repression, of the civil war, 
and of misguided policies. In spite of the decline in the support that the party enjoys among 
Mozambicans and of the no longer unthinkable prospect that it may soon taste life in the 
opposition, Frelimo remains the country’s dominant organisation under the new political 
dispensation: one of a number of African parties that managed not only to survive the 
transition from one-partism to pluralist competition, but also to remain in power. 
 
The party maintains an effective organisation that was built over two decades of monopolistic 
rule and that is now proving its efficacy in a multiparty context. In fact, Frelimo’s 
organisational set up has remained largely unchanged, both at national and local levels. An 
                                                 
25 Weinstein (2002), p.151. Such local- or regional-level political homogeneity is shared by several other 
African societies (Joel D. Barkan, ‘Elections in agrarian societies’, Journal of Democracy, 8 (1995), pp.106-
115). 
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alleged 30,000 células remain the party’s basic units, as in the tradition of communist parties, 
immediately followed by círculo and zona branches. It is at the latter level that party ‘offices’ 
(often simple huts built with traditional materials) are allegedly present all over the country. 
At higher local levels – namely, distrito and provincia – Frelimo structures benefit from the 
resources that the organisation inherited from its past privileged status as a party-state, 
notably in terms of buildings. The uninterrupted control of the state apparatus mitigated the 
changes that the party underwent. Under one-party rule, for example, state officials at 
different levels also held party positions (a provincial governor would automatically be 
Frelimo’s provincial secretary, a district administrator would be the party’s district first 
secretary, and so on). A formal separation of state and party structures was introduced in 
1990-1991, and this has reduced the direct relevance of party branches and the power and 
privileges of local party leaders.26 But the majority of state personnel still belong to Frelimo 
and thus, while state and party structures are now parallel rather than overlapping, the 
separation is largely an artificial one: to become real, it will have to wait until a different 
party takes power.27 
 
While party internal arrangements have by and large remained the same, they now have to 
accommodate a hugely increased party membership. Between 1977 and 1989, Frelimo 
replicated the Marxist-Leninist model of a vanguard party, according to which it was only 
people of proven militancy and loyalty who could be formal members of the party. Anybody 
who did not take active part in the liberation struggle, for instance, had to wait at least until 
1979 to get a membership card. The peasant-worker alliance at the backbone of the anti-
colonial movement was soon broken: while the peasantry was formally acknowledged as a 
key partner, it was to be economically and politically subordinated to the workers. Frelimo, a 
party of “vanguard members of the working class … came to depend on a numerically weak 
but relatively privileged urban proletariat, a burgeoning state bureaucracy, and an external 
network centred on Moscow”. 28 Some categories of people – such as religious believers or 
polygamists – were entirely excluded from becoming members. Selective requirements were 
meant to ensure high levels of commitment on the part of party leaders as well as of the rank 
and file. Thus, in the early 1980s, the limited membership of the party counted around 
100,000 affiliates and, by 1991, the figure had gone up but only to about 250,000.29 But when 
constitutional reform began to be discussed in the country, Frelimo also moved towards 
internal adjustments. It started to target groups that had been previously considered as 
‘enemies’ – such as traditional leaders and religious communities, and even business people – 
and began to portray itself as an open and ‘vast front congregating Mozambicans of all social 
classes and strata’.30 Membership increased, reaching the impressive figure of 1 million 400 
thousand in the space of a decade.31 
                                                 
26 Cf. Manning (1997), pp.93-94 & 96. 
27 A dis cussion with professor Luis De Brito helped me clarify these issues. 
28 Simpson (1993), pp.321-323. 
29 The 1982 figure is from Michel Cahen, ‘État et pouvoir populaire dans le Mozambique indépendent’, 
Politique Africaine, 19 (1985), p.42, while the 1991 is from Manuel Tomé, Secretary General of Frelimo (1995-
2002), interview (Maputo, 2 July 2002). 
30 Estatutos do Partido (1997, art. 2.2, emphasis added). At the 2002 Congress, the majority of the delegates 
were meant to come from the peasants, Antonio Simbine, Maputo, 26 June 2002. 
31 Manuel Tomé, Secretary General of Frelimo (1995-2002), interview (Maputo, 2 July 2002). The huge 
increase in the number of members also created new problems. In principle, party structures are meant to 
channel and mobilise the efforts of members towards the implementation of the party programme: 
“For example, a party objective is to increase agricultural production. This is a very real, practical thing. And 
party members are expected to work towards this achievement. It’s been like this since 1991, but it became 
clearer in 1997. We say ‘This is the programme, the government is going to implement it and party members are 
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The expanded membership has not significantly altered the sketchy collection of fees, which 
are currently raised from among 8-12% of all members only. Fee-raising thus adds little to 
the 3,433,800,000 meticais per month (equivalent to about US$ 1 million 680 thousand per 
year) that the Frelimo party currently receives from state funds (funds are allocated to 
political parties in proportion to the number of seats each of them holds in the Assembleia). 
The ruling party also benefits from the (mis-)use of state resources and from its links with the 
business community. Frelimo also set up some private enterprises, in recent years, although 
allegedly they are yet to produce any meaningful financial income.32 Overall, it remains very 
difficult to quantify these kinds of party resources. 
 
While the cell is supposed to be the basic unit of the party, inner processes have always 
worked in a top-down fashion. The core of the party is the national secretariat (for daily 
activities and administration) and, especially, a 15-member Commissão Politica (formerly 
known as Political Bureau). The latter meets fortnightly and has traditionally been the key 
decision-making body of the party, since the much larger Comitè Central only meets once a 
year. Party congresses, which so often marked turning points in the history of the party, are 
only held more or less every five years.33 
 
The authority of former combatants of the anti-colonial struggle in the Commissão and in the 
Comité Central has remained essentially unchallenged, in spite of the emergence of the new 
technocrats in government and of an influential parliamentary wing. ‘Freedom fighters’, who 
enjoy special privileges, are seen as guarantors of the superior ethics of the national 
leadership in the face of the new and allegedly more corruptible politicians brought to the 
fore by multiparty politics. The much publicised ‘renovação na continuidade’ quota system, 
which allows the party to integrate younger generations or outsiders, also ensures a built- in 
conservative majority in all the party organs to which it applies.34 
                                                                                                                                                        
meant to give the example and support it’. For example, we have campaigns to mobilise people to prevent 
cholera. Or, in the towns, to denounce corruption in state or private institutions” (Manuel Tomé). 
But new members are often less committed than the selected ones of the past. They are less active within party 
structures (for example, less regular in attending meetings) and, especially at eyes of older affiliates, they appear 
to adopt more opportunistic behaviours. In general, it has become more difficult to motivate a growing and less 
militant membership into participating. In rural areas that were off-limits to party activities during the civil war, 
local structures were revitalised (notably in the run up to elections or party congresses), but the huge size of 
Mozambique’s countryside implies significant logistical problems in the organisation of meetings beyond the 
local community. On the other hand, in urban areas, in spite of swifter communications, people are normally 
busier and hardly find time for party activities. The party is now trying to address these problems with the 
introduction of more ‘flexible’ structures, including the possibility for members to organise ad hoc meetings, 
rather than regularly attend cell meetings. 
32 Manuel Tomé, Secretary General of Frelimo (1995-2002), interview (Maputo, 2 July 2002). Party earnings 
include, for example, rents from hired buildings and shares from ownership of some hotels. A Sociedade de 
Partecipações Financeiras (SPF) was also set up by the party in the mid-1990s to fund party activities through 
private businesses (Savana, 14 June 2002, p.2). 
33 The very composition of each Congress is in the hands of the Commissão: except for four representatives to 
which every province is entitled, it is the latter that determines the proportion of men and women, workers and 
peasants, intellectuals, traditional leaders or youth, who are to attend the party general meeting. 
34 According to the ‘renovation within continuity’ principle, a percentage of the members of each party organ 
(e.g. the Commissão or the parliamentary group) must be replaced at every internal election, thus guaranteeing 
that incumbents cannot entirely close the way to new aspirants. In 2002, for example, “for the 15 members of 
the Political Commission, 5 had to be new members. So the Central Committee had to vote to re-elect 10 among 
the 15 sitting members, and then it selected 5 from a list of about 15 new candidates” (Manuel Tomé, Secretary 
General of Frelimo 1995-2002, interview, Maputo, 2 July 2002). The other side of the coin – i.e. the ‘remaining’ 
percentage – works as an assurance that old members will still take most positions (in the example, 66 % of the 
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The way Frelimo’s new secretary general and prospective candidate for the 2004 presidential 
election was selected, in mid-2002, testifies to the strengths and limitations of the party’s 
organisation. On the one hand, it was not Chissano alone who appointed his successor, 
proving that any given individual in the party, as powerful as he may be, has to take into 
account the latter’s institutionalised procedures.35 At the same time, however, the selection 
process was fundamentally oligarchic: a nomination was produced by the Commissão, it was 
then formally endorsed by the Comité Central and later approved by Congress. Armando 
Guebuza, one of Frelimo’s historic leaders and the chief of the party’s parliamentary 
bancada, was thus selected in a largely consensual and disciplined, but explicitly top-down 
and undemocratic, manner. The party leadership hardly had any trouble in seeing its choice 
approved, showing that it is in full control of the party hierarchy and that the legacy of 
Marxist-Leninist ‘democratic centralism’ still exerts its powerful influence.36 More broadly, 
the political culture of Frelimo remains that of a single party. As a prominent party figure 
points out, while the need for an alternative to one-party rule was perceived since the mid-
1980s, there was never a real discussion on what was to be the alternative model or 
institutional solution. The democratic package was taken as it was “presented to us by the 
outside world… Civic education was confined to electoral education, but nobody was taught 
to discuss with the other, we were only used to discuss among ourselves. And thus the culture 
of the deference for the chief remained, and pressures for democratic change inside the 
parties are not really there yet”. 37 
 
Renamo was originally a military organisation, and a relatively disciplined one, as it 
demonstrated by actually delivering peace after the peace agreement was signed in 1992. The 
former guerrillas, as mentioned, also succeeded in gaining legitimacy among broad sections 
of the population, in mounting a serious electoral challenge to the ruling party, and in 
maintaining their role as the principal opposition over almost a decade of multiparty politics. 
As it is currently working, however, the main opposition party manifests major weaknesses in 
its lack of a well- functioning organisation and, in part as a consequence, in its difficulties in 
operating within the new democratic institutions. The undisputed leadership of Afonso 
Dhlakama during the bush days played an important role in the subsequent development of 
the movement: “the history of the rebellion is the history of a group completely centralised 
around his leader… [with a] hyper-concentration of power… [that] could not avoid creating 
problems during Renamo’s process of ‘civilianisation’.”38 Dhlakama was not only “a man 
alone”, 39 but one who wished to remain so and, even under pluralist politics, he retained his 
                                                                                                                                                        
seats in the Commissão) even in a situation where, in the absence of quotas, pressures for change might have 
produced larger turnovers. 
35 Chissano announced in May 2001 that he would not seek re-election to the s tate presidency. Such an 
announcement was similar to the one made by Jerry Rawlings prior to the 2000 Ghanaian election, but Rawlings 
hand-picked his successor, something which did not happen in Maputo. 
36 Cahen (1985), p.41, describes Frelimo’s democratic centralism as “a principle of action, not of internal 
organisation”, whereby internal debates can be very open, but, once a party organ adopts an official line, its 
members are expected to observe a strict discipline in defending such a position in public or in relation to lower 
party organs. Following the democratic centralism logic, for example, the agriculture minister and a prominent 
representative of Frelimo’s ‘younger’ generation, Hélder Muteia, “came close to losing his Central Committee 
seat [in the election by Congress] … probably lost votes because he stood against Guebuza when, earlier in the 
month, the outgoing Central Committee voted on its recommended candidate for general secretary” (AIM 
Report, n. 234, 18 June 2002). 
37 Frelimo national official (anonymous), Maputo, June 2002. 
38 Cahen (1998), p.25. 
39 Cahen (1998), p.28. 
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unchallenged and personalist control over the party by systematically undermining the 
development of an effective and democratic party organisation. 
 
The transformation of Renamo into a political party was supported by a UN Trust Fund 
which, in the run up to the 1994 election, handed over US$17 million to the former rebel 
movement. The resources made available by foreign donors, however, were to be a temporary 
measure only: they were not meant to support a political side as such, but the country’s peace 
and democratisation process. As the transition was completed and it became clear that 
Renamo would not go back to the bush, the newborn party was left to walk on its own legs. 
The boycott of the 1998 local elections was an attempt to call in fresh money. As a matter of 
fact, the party receives substantial funding from the state. Of the US$1.4 million per year it 
receives, however, almost half is apparently left unaccounted for. It is alleged that only party 
leader Afonso Dhlakama knows how this or other financial resources the party pulled 
together from private donations are spent. Neither are party membership fees collected in any 
consistent way, notably because the party never had a tradition of a fee-paying membership. 
Most notably, money hardly trickles down to the districts. Establishing party local structures 
and keeping them alive with only a weak stream of funding coming in is an almost 
impossible task, and a chronic problem for African parties that are out of power. In areas 
where the party has many MPs, the latter helped keep party activities going, in others – 
notably in the south – the party’s presence has remained much more erratic. Renamo’s 
branches on the ground are often little more than a flag on a member’s house. Nevertheless, 
the party has long benefited from networks of support and, in particular, from the sympathetic 
role of the many traditional leaders who have adhered to it.40 This has allowed the party to 
expand its support by keeping in touch with the population at a time when, in spite of its 
better functioning organisation and physical structures, Frelimo appears to many as losing 
touch with the people. 
 
In spite of the major efforts embarked upon by the leadership to open the newly created party 
to qualified personnel – people who could staff its own cadre positions and represent Renamo 
within state institutions – the functioning of the organisation has remained almost totally in 
the hands of its president and closed to either external or internal scrutiny. 41 Dhlakama 
himself embodies the core of the party, the unifying centre of a network of different groups 
who hardly communicate to each other. Groups such as the ‘resistance’ fighters who were in 
the bush (including the likes of Vicente Ululu, José De Castro or, until recently, Raul 
Domingos); those ‘from the cities’, who had either been clandestinely active until 1992 or 
joined the party at that time; the former expatriates, also known as the ‘Lisbon group’, who 
supported the guerrilla from abroad; and the demobilised soldiers as well as those who joined 
the new Mozambican army – the FADM – who still see Renamo as their political referent. 
                                                 
40 Cf. Graham Harrison, ‘Mozambique between two elections: a political economy of transition’, 
Democratization 6:4 (1999), p.171. During the war, an alliance between traditional chiefs and Renamo 
developed in central Mozambique, largely as a result of Frelimo’s marginalisation of customary authorities and 
of the forced re-settlements of villagisation policies: “the implicit contract between Renamo and chiefs, who 
invited Renamo to set up bases on their land, was that Renamo would block government interference with their 
way of life and enable them to remain on their land. In return, the chiefs would serve as administrators for 
Renamo, taking the Renamo title of ‘mambos’ and mobilis ing the population to provide food and collaborators 
to serve as police ‘majubas’” (João Pereira, The politics of survival: peasants, chiefs and Renamo in Maringue 
district, Mozambique, 1982-992, Masters Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1999, p.8, cf.p.61). 
Renamo’s statute later established a Conselho Nacional das Familias e Chefes tradicionais as a consultative 
organ directly linked to the president (see Renamo Statutes, 1991 and 1994). 
41 The party statute sanctioned some aspects of Dhlakama ’s otherwise informal internal power: until the 2001 
reform, for example, a president-plus-two-members quorum was enough for the deliberations of the National 
Council (formally the main party organ in-between congresses) (Renamo Statute 1994, art.12.3). 
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Internal rules have little relevance to the working of the party. While party congresses should 
be organised every two years, for example, none was held between 1994 (when a small 
general meeting took place in Maringue) and 2001. In October 2001, a Congress re-elected 
Dhlakama as party president against two hopeless contestants who were meant to show a 
façade of internal democracy. A new National Council was also elected, with its membership 
expanded from 10-12 to 60. And a new statute was approved42 that reportedly formalises the 
existence of the Political Commission – a small body that had traditionally included the 
senior members of the party – after a decade or so of activity. But the re-structuring of the 
party was again marred by confusion and over-concentration of power and, once again, the 
personal whims of the party leader overruled formal regulations.43 
 
The authority of the party president only seemed to be countered by an alternative source of 
internal power when a Renamo parliamentary wing was formed, following the 1994 election 
of the first multiparty parliament. Dhlakama had decided that he would only run for the state 
presidency, not for a parliamentary seat, and thus he remained out of the assembly. But the 
latter soon turned out to be the place where the opposition could give voice to its demands 
and, to some extent, keep the government under scrutiny. In the absence of the party leader, 
Raul Domingos, the head of Renamo’s bancada, emerged as an influential and visible figure 
between 1994 and 2000. The (limited) autonomy of the party’s legislative wing, however, 
was undermined when, on the basis of some dubious accusations about secret deals and 
private interests that Domingos was pursuing with the government, Dhlakama decided to 
expel him from the party in late 2000. It is widely believed that Domingos was perceived by 
Dhlakama as a threat in view of the party Congress and of an internal election for the party 
leadership. Less than two years on, the marginalisation of prominent figures developed into a 
pattern, reaching a point where total confusion seemed to dominate party affairs in mid-2002. 
A prominent MP was suspended for allegedly mismanaging Dhlakama’s missed trip to an 
inter-party conference in the US. Another one resigned from the party’s parliamentary 
group.44 The secretary general of the party, who had been advocating the re-admission of 
Domingos, was dismissed only months after he took office. The head of the National Council 
was also quickly replaced by somebody handpicked by the party president and endorsed by 
the council itself. As Dhlakama took over as interim secretary general (combining the latter 
posit ion with that of party leader, and thus further concentrating power in his hands), the 
whole Political Commission was sacked on the grounds of ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘undemocratic’ 
behaviour, and a new one elected after a purge of a few moderates.45 Whether or not this 
string of dismissals is actually an attempt to sideline Sena members from the party leadership 
(Dhlakama is a Ndau), as some have been suggesting, it is a most patent manifestation of the 
weakness of the party’s internal arrangements and of the persistence of its ‘legendary 
disorganisation’.46 
                                                 
42 As of mid-2002, the new statute had not been circulated yet and high level party officials still referred to a 
1991 version, despite the latter had already been replaced: a slightly different 1994 statute (published by the 
Ministry of Justice in the Boletim da República , 28 December 1994, pp.907 ff.) was allegedly drafted by 
Dhlakama and a few associates only, and the larger party hardly knew about its existence. 
43 According to the new statute, the Political Commission was meant to be appointed by the president from 
among members of the National Council. Dhlakama, however, decided to stuff it with his close associates, of 
whom all but one did not belong to the NC. When somebody pointed out that this contravened the new rules, the 
president merely had the latter changed to state that members of the PC could not, at the same time, serve in the 
NC. Once again the personal whims of the party leader overruled formal regulations. 
44 Almeida Tambara, MP, resigned from the party in August 2002 (AIM, n.238, 22 August 2002). 
45 BBC World Service, 31 July 2002 and AIM, 28 July 2002. 
46 Cahen (1998), p.30. 
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Problems of party system legitimacy 
Evidence on whether political parties in Mozambique are perceived and supported as rightful 
and suitable organisations furthering the country’s democratic politics is both relatively 
scarce and mixed. The very end of the civil war – that is, the acceptance of the new political 
set up on the part of the former rebels – can be taken as an indication of the relative 
legitimacy of the new party system, which is broadly acknowledged as the main channel for 
political participation and the main ground were politics is to be played out. The fact that no 
domestic rebel nor social movement has emerged, since the peace agreement was signed, 
may partly be due to the country’s scarcity of resources for political activities and to the 
weakness of its civic associational life. But it is also a symptom that Mozambique’s main 
political constituencies are being represented by the party system as a whole, and notably by 
the two largest parties. Renamo leaders have occasionally organised vehement protests 
(notably the boycott of the 1998 municipal elections and the public demonstrations against 
the 1999 election results) or threatened a ‘return to the bush’ as a response to alleged 
malpractices on the part of the ruling group. Yet, Renamo have never been close to actually 
re-starting the war and, in fact, it has contributed to keeping all sections of society within the 
new pluralist framework, thus avoiding violent challenges to the latter. In spite of its vicious 
past, the main opposition party enjoys a broader legitimacy among ordinary Mozambicans 
than was expected during the war. As Cahen points out, during the 1994 ‘elections of 
silence’, the main campaign issue was not war but peace. People were mostly concerned with 
re-starting their lives in a pacified country, and, “with few exceptions, the society does not 
blame Renamo for the war, or at least no more than it blames Frelimo”. 47 
 
The former rebel movement may also benefit from a sort of ‘passive’ legitimacy. While 
Frelimo has been  traditionally regarded as one of the least corrupted among African parties48, 
economic and political reforms coincided with the increasing spread of corruption in the 
country’s governing institutions and ruling group. Mozambique’s leading independent 
journalist, Carlos Cardoso, was assassinated in late 2000 for investigating financial scandals 
that seemed to reach very close to the country’s top leadership. In a similar context, a party 
like Renamo, which has always been far from the sites of economic and governmental power, 
may profit from its image as a ‘clean’ alternative. 
 
According to regional surveys carried out in Maputo, Sofala and Nampula provinces, political 
parties are perceived to be more involved in corruption than organisations such as parliament 
and provincial or district administrations, albeit less so than the police, the government, 
tribunals or entrepreneurs. While parties are believed to be more interested in ending 
corruption than all of the abovement ioned organisations and actors (except for the executive), 
almost half of those interviewed (47%) declared they have no confidence whatsoever in 
political parties, as against less than one in five (18.7%) saying that they trust them. 49 These 
findings are, however, problematic. A different survey, for example, found that as many as 
44.9% of Mozambicans express some measure of trust towards political parties, while only 
                                                 
47 Cahen (1998), p.2. 
48 Cahen (1985), p.43; Hall & Young (1997), p.230; Joseph Hanlon, ‘Are donors to Mozambique promoting 
corruption?’, Crisis States Programme Working Paper, 15, Development Research Centre – Development 
Studies Institute, London School of Economics, 2002, p.6. 
49 Ética Moçambique, Estudo sobre corrupção - Moçambique 2001, Maputo: Ética Moçambique/Afrisurvey, 
2001, pp.71-72 & 86. 
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20.3% state that, in varying degrees, they do not.50 This trust, combined with the fact that 
parties are relatively identifiable and accessible at the local level, possibly explains why 
ordinary Mozambicans – 58.3% of whom support a political party, as against 37.3% who say 
they do not – are more likely to try and sort out their problems by talking to political party 
representatives than, for instance, by approaching members of the district, provincial or 
national administration or MPs.51 
 
While the party system as the locus of pluralist representation enjoys some consensus, the 
mutual legitimacy of the two main contenders seems to be weaker. Each of them accepts, in 
principle, that an opposite party may gain power through the ballot box – that is, they 
subscribe to the rules of electoral democracy and to the notion of tolerance for a plurality of 
parties – but when it comes, specifically, to ‘Frelimo’ or ‘Renamo’, they trade hateful 
accusations and portray each other as bearers of inexcusable guilt. Frelimo is attacked by 
Renamo for its monopolisation of political power, for its centralising and undemocratic 
attitudes, and for the alleged manipulation of election results. In the Assembleia, a Renamo 
parliamentarian having anything more than basic contacts with majority MPs undermines his 
own reputation inside the party. The leadership group of the governing party, on the other 
hand, has long claimed a sort of ‘natural right’ to rule Mozambique. Renamo’s fitness to 
govern the country is systematically questioned to delegitimise the opposition and present 
Frelimo, both domestically and internationally, as the only realistic option the country has. 
 
The dynamics of inter-party relations  
Opening the political sphere to non-Frelimo political actors did not modify, as pointed out, 
who the main contenders for power in Mozambique are: the country has a two-party system 
clearly centred on the competition between Frelimo and Renamo. Since the new constitution 
was adopted in 1990, a number of minor parties have sprung up, but they made few inroads 
into an electorate shaped and dominated by the Frelimo-Renamo cleavage, a deeply-rooted 
source of political identities generated by the country’s past conflicts. A UN Trust Fund for 
Assistance to Registered Parties was set up in mid 1993 with a US$ 3 million budget, and 
probably contributed to the proliferation of persona listic micro-parties. But the financial 
support it initially provided to the unarmed oppositions was not enough, for most of them, to 
overcome the electoral threshold. Of the 18 minor parties taking part in the 1994 election, 
only the União Democratica alliance – which grouped together the Palmo, Panade and 
Panamo parties – obtained 5% of the vote, necessary to gain representation in the national 
assembly. Similarly, in 1999, only the ten small parties of the União Eleitoral managed to 
enter parliament, from the backdoor, by forming joint lists with Renamo.52 In both cases, the 
threshold had a significant, albeit not a dramatic impact: 13% of the vote was lost to parties 
that did not pass the hurdle, that is, only around 87% of the electorate was represented in 
parliament. It is not clear whether the electoral failure of minor parties implied the exclusion 
of any important constituencies – as opposed to mere personal factions – from political 
representation. The most relevant voices that are currently left out of the Assembleia seem to 
be those of the workers’ party (the Partido Trabalhista, the third largest party in 1999 with 
2.7%), of Yaqub Sibindy’s Partido Independente de Moçambique (Pimo, a disguised Islamist 
party that is quite vocal and influential among the non-parliamentary opposition) and, 
                                                 
50 Centro de Estudos de População (CEP), Inquérito nacional de opinião pública 2001 , Maputo: Centro de 
Estudos de População at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2002, p.13. While the question was worded in 
virtually the same way, the difference in the responses may be explained by the fact that Etica was putting the 
question in the context of an inquiry on corruption. 
51 CEP (2002), p.21 & 36. 
52 See note 21 above. 
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perhaps, of Wehia Ripua’s Partido Democratico de Moçambique (Pademo). Unless or until 
some major political event will generate the momentum for a third actor to challenge the 
current duopoly, small parties will possibly find it even harder to enter parliament in the near 
future: state funding, which only parties with parliamentary representation have access to, 
may work as a further barrier to the success of any such challenger.53 
 
Therefore, the fragmentation of Mozambique’s party system has so far remained very limited. 
The Laakso-Taagepera index of party system fragmentation (ENPp = 1/åpi2) measures the 
‘effective’ number of parliamentary parties by weighing the relevance of each party 
according to its size, i.e. its share of assembly seats (pi). In the case of Mozambique’s first 
two legislatures, the ENPp was, respectively, 1.67 and 1.99.54Party fragmentation has long 
been associated with the instability not only of parliamentary governments but also of 
political regimes – notably in presidential systems55 – and Mozambique’s low score may thus 
have a positive upshot. In fact, the above values compare positively to those of 36 stable 
democracies, whose 3.16 average party fragmentation score falls between the two extremes 
of Botswana (1.35) and Papua New Guinea (5.98). The mean effective number of parties of 
the classic two-party systems of New Zealand, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the 
United States range between 1.96 and 2.40.56 
 
Mozambique’s low fragmentation scores reflect a situation where, in practice, Frelimo’s 
majority in the House has been clear-cut but not overwhelming. Over the past eight years, the 
two main parties have in fact confronted each other with parliamentary bancadas of 
comparable sizes (see Table 2, above, for each side’s number of MPs). When voting in the 
assembly, both party groups have displayed a relatively high degree of internal cohesion and 
discipline. This is partly the result of the polarisation and distance that separates the two sides 
– i.e. while a significant proportion of laws are passed by unanimity or consensus, the 
chances that individual members will switch party are relatively low – and, especially, of a 
constitutional provision that prohibits any MP from joining the parliamentary group of a 
party other than the one he or she has been elected with. 57 
                                                 
53 Cf. Peter Mair, Party system change: approaches and interpretations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, 
pp.105ff. on the cartel, oligopolistic effect of state funding for political parties in industrial democracies. 
54 The Laakso-Taagepera index implies that, when two, three or more parties have exactly the same strength, 
each of them will be fully counted, giving an index value of 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 and so on. When one or more of the 
parties are evidently weaker, the ENP is lower than the actual number of parties. The higher value of ENPp for 
the 1999 parliament reflects a slightly reduced gap between Frelimo and Renamo -UE in terms of shares of seats 
compared to 1994, in spite of the fact that União Democratica was also represented in the first parliament. 
(Since Renamo -UE presented unified lists at the 1999 election and later formed a single parliamentary group, 
they are here treated as one party). Mozambique’s effective number of ‘electoral parties’ (ENPe, based on the 
share of votes rather than on the share of seats obtained by each party) ranges between 2.6–3.03 and is thus only 
slightly higher than its ENPp. 
55 See, for instance, Scott Mainwaring, ‘Presidentialism, multipartism and democracy’, Comparative Political 
Studies 26:2 (July 1993), pp.198-228. 
56 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, pp.74 & 76-77. 
57 On the voting discipline of the two main bancadas in the 1994-1999 parliament, and on the percentage of 
laws passed by unanimity or consensus, see José Aime Macuane, Instituções e democratização no contexto 
africano: multipartidarismo e organização legislativa em Mozambique (19994-1999), PhD thesis, Instituto 
Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 2000, pp.104 & 107ff. Prior to the 1999 election, three MPs 
elected in 1994 for Renamo in Tete province (Francisco Raposo Binda, Celestino Bento, and Virgilio Chapata) 
defected and applied to join Frelimo (AIM n.168, 9 November 1999). Other cases of defections to Frelimo, 
outside parliament, include the former head of Renamo's information department, Virgilio Namalue (AIM n. 
164, 6 Septemb er 1999) and Rafael Companhia, a former Renamo delegate in Manica, who reportedly defected 
together with 25 others (AIM n.153, 9 March 1999). 
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Participation in parliament, as Manning points out, represented a crucial new challenge that 
influenced the distinctive development of each of the two main parties, their integration in the 
new democratic system, and thus the latter’s consolidation. In particular, the emergence of 
the parliamentary arena affected internal power relations between the party parliamentary 
group and the external hierarchy of the party. In the case of Frelimo, since most party leaders 
are also MPs, parliament offered a welcome new arena for the party hierarchy to reshape the 
party identity and rationale as an ‘interest articulator’ and, tentatively, as a counterbalance to 
the-party- in-government, which is dominated by the more technocratic and economically 
liberal tendency in the party. The parliamentary majority, in fact, challenged government 
policy on issues such as local electoral law and municipalities, defence bills, privatisation of 
the cashew indus try and of the banking sector. For Renamo, on the other hand, parliamentary 
participation further exposed and exacerbated organisational and human resources lacunae, 
with technically poor parliamentary performances, dependence of the bancada on external 
decision-making (as Dhlakama does not sit in the assembly), frequent recourse to boycotts or 
extra-parliamentary strategies, and haphazard policy positions (notably on constitutional 
reform). In particular, as already mentioned, the creation of a parliamentary wing largely 
consisting of recently recruited and comparatively-skilled party members initially clashed 
with Dhlakama’s effort to maintain a personalistic and extra-parliamentary leadership style.58 
 
Parliaments are also an important locus of dialogue and socialisation between opposing 
political forces. But political conflict in Mozambique is deep-seated, and few contacts take 
place in an assembly where cross-party networks seem to be entirely absent. Except for the 
plenary meetings of the House, MPs only sit together in parliamentary committees. 
Especially within Renamo, there is a sustained perception that people should not talk to 
members of the majority – as they are ‘Frelimo people’ – and those who do it tend to be 
looked at suspiciously by their colleagues. The fact that Dhlakama is not in parliament is not 
helping the development of relations between the two parties. Personal negotiations between 
Chissano and Dhlakama were key to the success of the transition and to the stabilisation of 
the country’s pluralist politics in its first years. Indeed, besides formal institutions and 
processes, a second ‘track’ for a top leadership-level management of political conflict 
developed, which was based on informal and personalised negotiations.59 Renamo’s 
complaints concerning electoral processes or outcomes in 1994, 1998 (local elections) and 
1999, as well as the occasional boycotts of parliamentary activities, were regularly followed 
by and overcome through informal bargaining between Dhlakama and Chissano – often with 
a crucial appeal to the international community – aimed at keeping Renamo in the game. 
Extra-parliamentary agreements, which followed the consensus-building logic of the 1992 
GPA, have been the way in which the leader of Renamo tried to exert a veto on major 
political developments in Mozambique. Manning notes, however, that while 
 
…routine side negotiations help lower the stakes of formal politics and reassure 
actors that politics need not be zero sum. At the same time, however, … if formal 
institutions are routinely circumvented, they cannot gain strength and acceptance. 
… these parallel processes … narrow the scope of representation and 
participation … reduce transparency, and weaken incentives for organizational 
development within both parties. … Moreover, a pattern is established in which 
                                                 
58 Carrie Manning, ‘Elite habituation to democracy in Mozambique: the view from Parliament, 1994-2000’, 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 40:1 (2002a). 
59 Carrie Manning, ‘Conflict management and elite habituation in post-war democracy: the case of 
Mozambique’, Comparative Politics, 35:1 (2002b). 
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the ‘losers’ of formal processes are encouraged to disrupt, boycott or publicly 
disparage those processes in order to initiate informal bargaining … this is likely 
to undermine public confidence in formal democratic institutions.60 
 
The space for such informal and personalised negotiations, however, seems to be waning. 
Thus, for instance, the dialogue that the two leaders began in early 2001 over the election 
results collapsed when the president refused Dhlakama’s preconditions and the latter 
withdrew from the talks. Chissano has progressively moved away from the model of inter-
leadership consensus, rejecting the idea that the government needs Dhlakama’s consensus on 
issues for which the latter insists on being part of decision-making. 
 
Mozambique’s new democratic politics: peaceful and stable, but weak and untested  
The end of the civil war in Mozambique paved the way to the partial constitutionalisation of 
the country’s politics, notably through the introduction of electoral competition and its 
tentative routinisation. In this new context, the party system is a major instrument for political 
expression and for the channelling and peaceful management of conflicts. The very 
participation of the main political actors in the multiparty dispensation contributes to the 
assertion of constitutional rule and to the gradual adoption of democratic attitudes and 
behaviour, that is, to the progressive legitimisation and institutionalisation of competitive 
politics.61 
 
The paper has shown how both Frelimo and Renamo – as well as the competition between the 
two of them – have deep-seated historical origins and well-established regional roots. These 
are reflected in the current stability of electoral competition (which is shaped by the cleavage 
generated by the civil war) and in the low fragmentation of the party system (which does not 
allow an easy entry to any third challenger). The resulting party system enables the new 
democratic framework to actually accommodate and integrate the country’s most relevant 
political actors, and thus to gain a significant degree of legitimacy. The sustained presence of 
the main contenders throughout national elections, and the virtual lack of impact for ‘flash’ or 
single-election parties, also increase the potential for the electorate to hold the executive and 
legislators accountable, since, where “voters are presented with a new set of parties before 
every election, there is no way the party labels can inform them about the parties’ past 
activities”. 62 
 
Yet, a number of aspects concerning the Mozambican party system are negatively affecting 
the deepening of democratic politics. For a start, the legitimacy of the party system is 
weakened by the persistence of the polarisation generated by the civil conflict, as the tough 
antagonism that divides the two parties only leaves marginal room for mutual recognition. 
Further, the ethno-regional entrenchment of the two main parties bestow a communal 
connotation on the electoral competition. The latter is undermined by a dangerous division of 
the country into Renamo-dominated versus Frelimo-dominated areas, a phenomenon 
similarly found in many other countries on the continent. Most importantly, Mozambique’s 
two-party system remains unbalanced. This is also a feature common to other African 
                                                 
60 Manning (2002b). 
61 Cf. Diamond (1999), pp.65ff.; and Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems in democratic transition and 
consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996,ch.1. 
62 Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand,  ‘Political parties and democratic consolidation in Africa’, Democratization , 
9:3 (2002b), p.38. 
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multiparty polities, where dominance by a non-authoritarian party appears to be prevalent.63 
In Maputo, power is still heavily concentrated in the hands of Frelimo, a party that has 
governed the country uninterruptedly for over twenty-five years, that has repeatedly and 
successfully (if undemocratically) addressed the question of internal succession, that retains a 
disciplined organisation and is fundamentally institutionalised. As robust as its electoral 
support is, Renamo’s opposition consists of a strongly personalistic and weakly organised 
party, struggling to operate within state institutions and to accommodate internal differences. 
In this sense, the party system went through what is not only a limited, but an uneven process 
of institutionalisation. 64 The relative organisational vigour of the ruling party – crucially 
favoured by its control over state resources – far outdoes that of the main opposition. The 
latter is rather more established in the ‘public mind’65 than in terms of functioning party 
internal arrangements. Renamo’s disorganised opposition finds it difficult (and even 
‘unnatural’) to try and articulate policy programmes or to scrutinise government activities in 
any systematic manner. The political socialisation and training of party cadres are penalised 
by a leadership for which skilful people are seen as potential challengers that have to be 
marginalized. This inevitably damages the capacity of the party to operate effectively within 
the democratic institutions of the state. The latter, as pointed out, are undermined by 
Dhlakama’s attempts to circumvent them and bargain directly with Chissano. None of this 
bodes well for the country’s democratic consolidation prospects. 
 
Overall progress towards a pluralist political culture and a fully democratic politics in 
Mozambique has been limited. A most serious problem the country has to face is its 
extremely high rate of corruption. As a manifestation of illegal and unconstitutional practices, 
corruption is the very opposite of the rule of law and, in general, “countries with high indexes 
of corruption suffer low levels of trust on the part of their citizens towards the institutions of 
the state and the political system”.66 The perception that a regime is deeply corrupted, for 
example, may reflect in popular support for violent or non-democratic solutions, that is, in the 
presence of the ‘subjective conditions for the emergence of collective violence’.67 Such a 
disposition is reportedly very high in Mozambique, at least so far as the claim that “cutting 
off the hands” or “adopting death penalty” would significantly reduce corruption can be taken 
to indicate an individual’s tendency towards violent solutions (a link that, at best, appears to 
be indirect). At the same time, however, there does not seem to be any ample support for non-
democratic options. A large majority of those interviewed appear unconvinced that a one-
party or a military system – let alone the abolition of parliament and parties – would 
significantly alter current levels of sleaze.68 The existing multiparty system (‘free elections 
and many parties’) seems to be plainly preferred to alternatives such as one-partism, 
traditional authority structures or the old colonial order. A more specific comparison with the 
country’s single party experience shows that people appreciate the much greater freedom to 
express their opinions, to exert their right to vote without pressures, and to belong to any 
organisation they like.69 A different investigation, however, reveals that Mozambicans remain 
sceptical about any real improvements in their capacity to actually influence government and, 
vice versa, in the government’s capacity to treat everybody equally and to raise living 
standards. It is indeed on the issue of living standards that one-party rule compares positively 
                                                 
63 Cf. Randall & Svåsand (2002b), p.35. 
64 Cf. Randall & Svåsand (2001), p.8. 
65 Cf. Randall & Svåsand (2001), p.10. 
66 Ética (2001), p.22. In its 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Mozambique 
among the 10 most corrupted countries (81st out of a total of 90 countries). See http://www.transparency.org. 
67 Ética (2001), p.94. 
68 Ética (2001), p.96). 
69 CEP (2002), pp.78-79 & 95. 
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to the current system. 70 Some kind of nostalgia also seems to surface in the scarce political 
tolerance that the population shows, surely the legacy of a monolithic political culture. 
Dissent and open debate are still seen by most as deserving exclusion: popular acceptance of 
the right of people who ‘talk negatively about the government’ to manifest, to stand for 
public office, to talk on the radio and write in newspapers, or even to vote, is very low.71 
Moreover, while a majority of Mozambicans reject the idea that, at times, a non-democratic 
form of government may be better than democratic government, most of them think that the 
latter should act like a father guiding his children (76.1%), rather than being dependent on or 
at the service of its people (21.8%).72 At the end of the day, they subscribe to a notion of ‘real 
democracy’ as a system where “people have equal access to food, housing and education” 
(44.5%), rather than one in which “the majority of the people decide and rights and freedoms 
are protected” (33.6%). 
 
Since Mozambique’s transition to electoral politics was completed, two major political 
controversies have emerged. Both controversies concern the very legitimacy of electoral 
contests. In 1998, Renamo staged a boycott of the country’s first municipal elections after 
Frelimo refused to extend municipality status to areas other than thirty-three urban centres 
whose selection was perceived to favour the ruling party. The following year, Renamo went 
back to ballot-box competition for the presidential and legislative elections, but it then 
complained about the election outcome (the results, as of late-2002, had not been officially 
confirmed). In demanding a recount or a fresh contest, the leader of the opposition even 
threatened to set up Renamo administrations in regions where the party won a majority.73 
While the opposition party later seemed to recognize the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
rebuffed its petition, and thus to accept the election results, it subsequently came back to the 
issue time and again. In late 2000, Renamo organised public protests against the election 
results, and violence exploded in the northern town of Montepuez when the police intervened 
against demonstrators. Forty people died and another eighty of those arrested dramatically 
lost their lives in an overcrowded jail. At the 2001 party congress, Dhlakama again 
denounced the alleged electoral rigging of the national elections.74 
 
What do elections tell us, then, about the legitimacy of the new regime? While relatively 
isolated, the above episodes point, at a minimum, to a problematic acceptance of election 
outcomes; indeed, a problem that is shared by several other African countries. Although the 
1994 and 1999 elections were internationally recognised as actual expressions of the will of 
the voters,75 in both cases there were complaints about the results being fixed or negotiated by 
the two main parties, if not unilaterally manipulated by Frelimo. At best, the legitimacy of 
electoral procedures needs further verification. The so-called double-turnover test, whereby a 
ruling party leaves power to an election-winning opposition and the latter, in turn, does the 
same at a subsequent election, 76 may provide additional corroboration. A double-turnover, 
however, is not to be expected any time soon. As a matter of fact, in 2004, Frelimo will 
‘celebrate’ its thirty years of uninterrupted power. Renamo, on the other hand, is still waiting 
for the opportunity to legally exercise political authority and administer the country at 
                                                 
70 CEP (2002), pp.78-79 & 95. 
71 CEP (2002), p.27. 
72 CEP (2002), pp.94ff. 
73 AIM, n.175, 8 February 2000. 
74 Savana (Maputo), 26 October 2001, p.2. 
75 For instance, Human Rights Watch says the 1999 elections were “free and mostly fair” (HRW Mozambique 
2001). 
76 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman and London: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
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national as much as at local level. As Weinstein notes, Mozambique’s winner-take-all and 
strongly centralised presidentialism puts a huge premium on a victory at the centre. The 
elected president appoints the ten provincial governors, who cascade- like appoint district 
chiefs. This means that the ruling party controls the administration of every locality except 
those (33 cities and districts out of 411 localities) that are allowed to elect their municipal 
authorities. If Renamo wins an election, “the prospect of ‘payback time’ is frightening” and 
potentially destabilising. 77 After the relatively successful elections of the 1990s, which 
opened up a previously closed and uncompetitive political system, a crucial test of 
Mozambique’s young democracy will be an actual turnover in power. 
                                                 
77 Weinstein (2002), p.153. A further way of balancing presidential power would be an opposite majority in the 
assembly, but this may result in additional destabilising pulls (cf. Juan J. Linz, ‘The perils of presidentialism’, 
Journal of Democracy, 1:1 (1990), pp.51-69; Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), The failure of 
presidential democracy. Comparative perspectives, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994). 
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